










EQUILIBRIUM UNEMPLOYMENT WITH 
OUTSOURCING AND WAGE SOLIDARITY UNDER 






CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 1988 










An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 




EQUILIBRIUM UNEMPLOYMENT WITH 
OUTSOURCING AND WAGE SOLIDARITY UNDER 





We evaluate the effects of outsourcing and wage solidarity on wage formation and 
equilibrium unemployment in a heterogeneous labour market, where wages are determined by 
a monopoly labour union. We find that outsourcing promotes the wage dispersion between the 
high-skilled and low-skilled workers. When the labour union adopts a solidaristic wage 
policy, it will magnify, and not dampen, this tendency. Further, higher outsourcing will 
increase equilibrium unemployment among the high-skilled workers, whereas it will reduce it 
among the low-skilled workers. Overall, outsourcing will reduce economy-wide equilibrium 
unemployment under the reasonable condition that the proportion of high-skilled workers is 
sufficiently low. 
JEL Code: E23, E24, J31, J51. 







Department of Economics 
P.O. Box 17 
Arkadiankatu 7 




Department of Economics 
Göteborg University 








April 2, 2007 
The authors thank the Research Unit of Economic Structures and Growth (RUESG), financed 
by Academy of Finland, University of Helsinki, Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation, Bank of Finland 
and Nokia Group, for financial support. Koskela also thanks Academy of Finland (grant No. 
1117698) for further financial support and Göteborg University for good hospitality.  2
I.     Introduction   
 
 
On a global scale wage differences are enormous across countries ranging from, 
for example, 1,10 € per hour in China to above 27 € per hour in Denmark, Germany or 
Norway (see, e.g. Sinn (2007)). These wage differences constitute a central explanation 
for the increasingly significant business practice of international outsourcing. In 
countries with strong labour market imperfections large-scale outsourcing is often 
considered to pose a significant threat for employment, in particular for the low-skilled 
labour force segment. These concerns are often expressed by labour unions, and unions 
often accommodate the particular concern for the low-skilled labour force segment by 
advocating solidaristic wage policies.
1  
In this study we analyze the effects of international outsourcing to low-wage 
countries on equilibrium unemployment in high-wage countries characterized by strong 
labour market imperfections. More precisely, we focus on a heterogeneous labour 
market where wages are determined by a monopoly labour union endowed with 
solidaristic objectives. We address the following questions: How does outsourcing 
affect wage formation, and in particular wage dispersion, in a heterogeneous labour 
market, where the labour union operates with some degree of wage solidarity? What are 
the effects of outsourcing on equilibrium unemployment among high-skilled and low-
skilled workers? How are these effects related to the degree of wage solidarity? How 
can we characterize the aggregate effects of outsourcing on equilibrium unemployment 
in the presence of solidaristic wage policies? What is the optimal production mode 
under imperfectly competitive and segmented labour markets?  
We find that the own wage elasticity and the cross wage elasticity of the low-
skilled labor demand depend positively on the amount of outsourcing, whereas all these 
elasticities are independent of the amount of outsourcing for the demand of the high-
skilled labour. A higher share of outsourced production will decrease the wage set by a 
monopoly union for the low-skilled labour, and increase wage for the high-skilled 
                                                 
1   See also Stefanova (2006) concerning the East-West dichotomy of outsourcing in the European 
union in the context of its 2004 eastward enlargement.     
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labour. Consequently, outsourcing promotes the wage dispersion between the two 
labour force segments. The labour union will magnify, and not dampen, this tendency 
by adopting a solidaristic wage policy.  
Outsourcing and wage solidarity have opposite employment effects among the 
high-skilled and low-skilled workers. Increased outsourcing increases equilibrium 
unemployment among the high-skilled workers, whereas it reduces it among the low-
skilled workers. By combining these effects we draw the general conclusion that 
outsourcing will reduce economy-wide equilibrium unemployment under the 
reasonable condition that the proportion of the high-skilled workers is sufficiently low. 
Furthermore, increased wage solidarity reduces equilibrium unemployment for the 
high-skilled workers, whereas it increases equilibrium unemployment for the low-
skilled workers. Finally, we characterize the optimal production mode from the firm’s 
point of view. We find that when the firm faces a labour union with a higher degree of 
wage solidarity this will increase the positive returns from outsourcing through the 
effects of solidarity on the wage formation of the low-skilled workers. Overall our 
paper adds to the existing literature by analyzing the effects of outsourcing and wage 
solidarity between the high-skilled and the low-skilled workers on wage formation and 
equilibrium unemployment within the framework of imperfectly competitive labour 
markets. 
We are not aware of any existing study which would have evaluated the 
employment consequences of outsourcing in an imperfectly competitive labour market 
with a heterogeneous labour force represented by a labour union with solidaristic 
preferences. A number of studies have, however, explored some related effects of 
outsourcing. Danthine and Hunt (1994) have both theoretically and empirically studied 
the effects of international outsourcing and foreign direct investment on wage 
formation in the home country. They showed that higher product market integration 
implies intensified product market competition, which moderates wage increases in 
unionized and homogeneous labour markets. Glass and Saggi (2001) have theoretically 
studied the causes of outsourcing and its effects, finding that higher international 
outsourcing lowers the relative wage of domestic workers and increases the profits, 
creating greater incentives for innovation. Egger and Egger (2003) have empirically  4
studied the impact of a decline in trade barriers on outsourcing of low-skilled labour 
and argued that outsourcing raises the relative wages of high-skilled labour in the home 
country, if the low-skilled labour is unionized in the home country. In terms of empirics 
Feenstra and Hanson (1999) have studied the impact of foreign outsourcing and 
technology on wages using U.S. data over the period 1979-1990. According to their 
findings, wages of low-skilled workers have fallen relative to those of high-skilled 
workers. Yan (2006) has used Canadian data to show that both foreign outsourcing and 
ICT (information and communication technologies) play important roles to increase the 
demand for skills independently of whether it is measured by the wage-bill share or 
employment share of non-production workers. 
Recently, Senses (2006) has argued that an increased probability of outsourcing 
associated with a decline in foreign intermediate input prices and an increase in the 
elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestic inputs might increase the wage 
elasticity of labour demand. He has provided relevant empirical evidence, according to 
which a production mode with more outsourcing increases the wage elasticity of labour 
demand. As mentioned earlier, in our model we show that both the own wage elasticity 
and cross wage elasticity of low-skilled labour depends positively on outsourcing. 
Our study proceeds as follows. Section II presents the basic structure of the model 
as well as the time sequence of the decisions regarding outsourcing, wage setting and 
labour demand for the separate segments of high-skilled and low-skilled workers. We 
study the segmented labour demand for the heterogeneous labour force in section III, 
whereas we focus on wage determination by a monopoly labour union in Section IV. 
Section V explores how the production mode and the union’s degree of wage solidarity 
affect equilibrium unemployment. In section VI we characterize the optimal production 
mode in the presence of the imperfectly competitive and segmented labour market. 






II.  Basic Framework 
 
 
We design on a model with heterogeneous workers in an imperfectly competitive 
domestic labour market. At stage 1, in the long run, firms commit themselves to the 
production mode. Under outsourced production firms acquire the low-skilled labour 
input at the factor price c, which is lower than the wage of the domestic low-skilled 
workers. Moreover, there is a sunk cost of establishing capacity for foreign outsourced 
production. In order to exploit M units of the outsourced low-skilled labour input firms 
have to make the irreversible investment  ) (M g  with the properties that  0 ) ( ' > M g  and 
0 ) ( ' ' > M g . This captures the idea the exploitation of the marginal cost advantages 
offered by production in low-wage countries typically also requires that the firms make 
irreversible investments into the establishment of networks of suppliers in the relevant 
low-wage countries.  
At stage 2, conditional on the firm’s commitment to a production mode, the 
labour union determines the wages for the high-skilled and low-skilled workers subject 
to the labour demands for each type of labour by the firms. At stage 3 firms make 
domestic employment decisions with respect to both the high-skilled and low-skilled 
workers by taking wage rates and outsourcing as given.   
The time sequence of decisions is summarized in Figure 1 and the decisions at 
each stage are analyzed by using backward induction. 
 
 
        stage 1                      stage 2                         stage 3 
 
                                                                                                  time 
     
 
 outsourcing               wage setting             high-skilled labour demand H  and 
 decision M                H w and  L w                low-skilled  labour demand L 
 
              
                    Figure 1: Time sequence of decisions 
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This timing structure seems plausible when the implementation of a production 
mode with outsourcing requires irreversible investments concerning the establishment 
of a network of foreign suppliers. The relative timing of wage formation and 
outsourcing could also be reversed. Such a reversed timing structure would be relevant 
if the firms could flexibly adjust their production mode, and decide whether to initiate 
foreign outsourcing, once the domestic wages are determined. Skaksen (2004) has 
analyzed this case using a Cobb-Douglas production function applied to a 
homogeneous labour force.  
 
 
III.   High-Skilled and Low-Skilled Labour Demand 
 
 
At stage 3 the firm decides about the high-skilled labour demand H  and the low-
skilled labour demand L in order to maximize the profit function  
 
) ( ) , , ( ) , , (
) , (
M g cM L w H w M L H F M L H Max L H
L H
− − − − = π 3 2 1                             (1)                     
 
by taking the wage for high-skilled labour,  H w , the wage for low-skilled labour,  L w , 
and the outsourced low-skilled labour input M as given. We assume a Cobb-Douglas-
type production function




a a M L H M L H F
− + =
1 ) ( ) , , ( , where  1 0 < < ρ  and  1 0 < < a . The parameter  0 > γ  
captures the productivity of the outsourced low-skilled labour input relative to the 
domestic low-skilled labour input. The marginal products of the high-skilled labour and 
the low-skilled labour are 
a a
H M L aH X F
− − − + =
1 1 1 ) ( γ ρ
ρ  and 
a a
L M L a H X F
− − + − = ) )( 1 (
1 γ ρ
ρ , respectively, where 
a a M L H X
− + =
1 ) ( γ . 
                                                 
2   Koskela and Stenbacka (2007) have adopted a CES production function to analyze equilibrium 
unemployment and optimal outsourcing under labour market imperfections with a homogeneous 
labour force. 
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Concerning the impact of the outsourced low-skilled labour input on the marginal 
products of domestic labour inputs one can show that  
 
0 ) 1 ( ) (
1 1 1 > − + =
− − − γρ γ ρ
ρ a a M L H X F
a
HM                                                            (2a)       
 
and                              
 
[ ] 0 ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( ) (
1 1 < − − − + − =
− − − ρ γ γ ρ
ρ a a M L H X F
a a
LM .                                        (2b)                                 
 
Thus, for this production function the domestic high-skilled labour input and the 
outsourced low-skilled labour input are complements, whereas the low-skilled domestic 
labour input and the outsourced low-skilled labour input are substitutes. Ethier (2005) 
has introduced a partly related production function to analyze the decision between 
international outsourcing and in-house production in his analysis of the effect of 
globalization on the skill premium.  
Given both the outsourcing decision and the wages determined by the monopoly 
labour union the first-order conditions characterizing the domestic high-skilled and 
low-skilled labour demands are  
 
[] 0 ) ( ) (
1 1 1 1 = − + + =
− − − −
H
a a a a
H w M L aH M L H γ γ ρ π
ρ                                  (3a) 
 
[] 0 ) ( ) 1 ( ) (
1 1 = − + − + =
− − −
L
a a a a
L w M L H a M L H γ λ ρ π
ρ  .                              (3b) 
 
 
These first-order conditions imply the following relationship between the high-skilled 













=            .                               (4) 
 
Substituting (4) into (3b) gives (see Appendix A) the low-skilled labour demand, which 
can be expressed as follows  8
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1 > − = − − ρ ρ ρ ρ












w L L w L
L
L  denotes the own wage 










w L H H w L
H  denotes the cross 
wage elasticity of the low-skilled labour with respect to the high-skilled wage in the 
absence of outsourcing, i.e. when  0 = M . These elasticities are higher with weaker 
decreasing returns to scale.  
According to (5), a more extensive outsourcing activity will decrease the low-
skilled labour demand. This feature is consistent with empirical evidence. For instance, 
Diehl (1999) has presented empirical evidence for German manufacturing industries in 
support of this hypothesis. Moreover, Görg and Hanley (2005) have used plant-level 
data of the Irish electronic sector to empirically conclude that international outsourcing 
reduces plant-level labour demand. 
In the presence of outsourcing the wage elasticities of the low-skilled labour can 
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ε  As 
we mentioned earlier, Senses (2006) has recently presented empirical evidence 
according to which higher outsourcing increases the wage elasticity of labour demand, 
which lies in conformity with our analysis of the demand for low-skilled labour. 
Moreover, and importantly, the elasticity of low-skilled labour with respect to  9


















ε ε  meaning that the outsourcing 
elasticity of low-skilled labour demand is positive. Differentiating this with respect to  





























.                                   (7) 
 
This means that higher outsourcing, ceteris paribus, will increase the outsourcing 
elasticity of the low-skilled labour.  
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w H L L w H
L  and 
. 0 = − =
H
M H M H
M ε  These elasticities are also higher with weaker decreasing returns to 
scale, but unlike the case with low-skilled labour both the own wage and cross wage 
labor demand elasticities for high-skilled labour are independent of outsourcing. 
 
We can now summarize our findings regarding the properties for heterogeneous labour 
demand in the presence of outsourcing as follows.  
 
Proposition 1 In the presence of outsourcing  
(a) the own wage elasticity, the cross wage elasticity and the outsourcing 
elasticity for the low-skilled labour demand depend positively on the amount of 
outsourcing, whereas  
(b) the own wage elasticity and the cross wage elasticity for the high-skilled 
labour demand are independent of the amount of outsourcing.   10
 
IV.    Wage Formation by Monopoly Labour Union for High-Skilled 
and Low-Skilled Workers   
 
We now proceed to investigate the wage formation and continue to consider the 
acquired outsourcing M  as given. The monopoly union determines the wages in 
anticipation of optimal in-house employment decisions by the firm.  
The objective function of the labour union with heterogenous workers as 
members is assumed to be  H b w L b w U H H L L ) )( 1 ( ) ( − − + − = α α , where  ) ( H L b b  is the 
(exogenous) outside option available to the low-skilled (high-skilled) workers and 
α ( ) 1 α −  describes the trade union’s relative preference for the low-skilled (high-
skilled) workers. In the presence of wage solidarity we have  2 / 1 > α , whereas 2 / 1 = α  
captures that the labour union has no relative preferences differentiation across the two 
labour force segments.
3 Ceteris paribus, a solidaristic (egalitarian) wage policy entails a 
balanced wage structure which implies restraint on wage increases for high-paid groups 
of employees with above-average productivity with larger percentage rises for low-paid 
groups with below-average productivity.
4 In general, the tradition of solidaristic wage 
policy is stronger in Europe than in the USA and consistent with that the wage 
dispersion in the USA is clearly greater than in the European countries (for empirics, 
see e.g. Schulten (2002)). 
Kreickemeier and Nelson (2006) have analyzed the effects of global and national 
technological change on employment and relative wages under “fair” wage constraints. 
But they assume that the firms are wage setters, but they also emphasize that a fruitful 
avenue for further research is to allow for imperfectly competitive labour markets. 
                                                 
3          See also Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004), p. 401-403 concerning the monopoly labour union 
specification.  
4       Agell and Lommerud (1992) have developed and explored the alternative rationales for egalitarian 
wage objectives of the labour union. One explanation for egalitarian wage patterns is simply that 
the labour union has redistributive preferences. A less formalized way of picturing the same 
phenomenon is to rely on arguments concerning union solidarity and ideology. By narrowing 
wage differentials between labour union members, it may increase the welfare of risk-averse 
workers by providing social insurance from a long-run perspective. See also Horn and Svensson 
(1986) and Rees (1993).    11
Egger and Kreickemeier (2005) have used the “fairness” approach to efficiency wages, 
decided by firms when the efficiency wage is derived based on a  “fairness” constraint 
(see e.g. Akerlof and Yellen (1990)), in a model of international outsourcing where the 
wage inequality and unemployment rate are determined simultaneously. In such a 
framework they argue that the fairness constraint is binding for the low-skilled workers, 
giving rise to unemployment of this group, while high-skilled workers face no 
unemployment in equilibrium.  
Given the amount of outsourcing, the monopoly labour union sets wages both for 
the high-skilled and low-skilled workers so as to maximize the weighted surplus to its 
heterogeneous members according to  
 
{ H b w L b w U H H L L
L w H w
) )( 1 ( ) ( max
) , (
− − + − = α α                                                        (9)  
                   s.t.   0 = H π  and   0 = L π         . 
 
The first-order conditions associated with (9) can be written as  
 
[] 0 ) ( ˆ ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( = − − + − − =
H
L






H H wH ε α ε ε α                                 (10a) 
[] 0 ) ( ) )( 1 ( ˆ ) ˆ 1 ( = − − − + − =
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L L wL ε α ε ε α                                  (10b) 
 
Using the first-order conditions characterizing the high-skilled and low-skilled 
labour demand we have the following relationships between the high-skilled and low-
skilled labour: 
1 ) 1 (























L M m / ≡ . Substituting these into equations (10a) and (10b) gives, after some 
rearrangements, the following optimal wage set by the monopoly labour union for the 







) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 (
) 1 )( 1 (
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*
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ρα γ α ρ
γ α
α   .                                                   (11) 
 
The comparative statics in terms of m  (the ratio between outsourcing and low-
skilled labour) and α  (the labour union’s relative preference for the low-skilled 

























































































       .                                                 (12b) 
 
A higher ratio of outsourcing to low-skilled labour increases the wage for high-skilled 
workers. In terms of the effect of expanded outsourcing we have the same qualitative 













w H H . Further, from (12b) we see that the wage for the high-
skilled workers depends negatively on the degree of wage solidarity of the monopoly 
labour union.  
In a similar way the optimal wage set by the monopoly labour union for the low-
skilled labour can be expressed as (see Appendix B)  
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ρ α γ α ρ α
γ α
α  .                        (13) 
                                                                                                                           
The comparative statics for the low-skilled wage with respect to m  and α  is found to 
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   .                                   (14b) 
 
A higher ratio of outsourcing to the low-skilled labour will decrease the wage rate of 
low-skilled workers. In terms of the effect of expanded outsourcing we have the same 













w L L . Further, from (14b) we see that the wage for 
the low-skilled workers depends positively on the degree of wage solidarity of the 
monopoly labour union.  
In particular, if the labour union operates with no solidaristic objectives (
2
1
= α ) 
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* * m w m w L H > .   14
  By combination of (12a) and (14a) we can infer that outsourcing induces an 
increase in the wage dispersion between the high-skilled and low-skilled workers. 
Similarly, comparing (12b) with (14b) verifies the natural property that increased wage 
solidarity will reduce the wage dispersion between the two labour market segments. 
These predictions both seem to theoretically confirm common views. Interestingly, by 
investigating the derivative of the wage dispersion with respect to the parameter 
capturing wage solidarity we find that 
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.    
 
This means that wage solidarity serves as an instrument with the effect of increasing, 
and not decreasing, the tendency of outsourcing to increase wage dispersion. In this 
respect wage solidarity tends to magnify the dispersion-increasing effect of 
outsourcing. This feature can intuitively be explained as follows. A higher degree of 
wage solidarity raises the wage for the low-skilled workers. But, under such 
circumstances the strengthened discipline imposed by increased outsourcing will have a 
stronger wage-reducing effect. 
 
We now summarize our analysis of the wage formation as follows. 
 
Proposition 2 In the presence of outsourcing   
(a) a higher share of outsourced production will decrease the wage for the low-
skilled labour and increase it for the high-skilled labour, thereby inducing 
increased wage dispersion, whereas  
(b) a higher degree of wage solidarity will increase the wage for the low-skilled 
labour and decrease it for the high-skilled labour, thereby reducing the wage 
dispersion. 
(c) a higher degree of wage solidarity magnifies the dispersion-enhancing effects 
of outsourcing.  
  15
Proposition 2 (c) has interesting implications for labour unions concerned with 
threats imposed by outsourcing. From Proposition 2 (c) we can conclude that the labour 
union would actually promote, not dampen, the wage dispersion induced by 
outsourcing if it increased the degree of wage solidarity in face of this threat.   
A large spectrum of empirical studies offers evidence in support of the hypothesis 
that outsourcing increases wage dispersion. Feenstra and Hanson (1999, 2001) have 
empirically studied the impact of foreign outsourcing on wages. According to their 
findings, based on data from U.S. and other countries, wages of the low-skilled workers 
have fallen relative to those of the high-skilled workers as a consequence of foreign 
outsourcing. Also Wood’s (1998) review about developed countries argues that the 
evidence is in fact mostly consistent with the hypothesis that the main cause of the rise 
in labour market inequality is globalization. Hijzen et.al (2005) have provided evidence 
from UK data that international outsourcing is an important component in explaining 
changes in the skill structure of manufacturing industries. Geishecker and Görg (2004) 
have found evidence that outsourcing has reduced real wages for workers in the lowest 
skill categories, while it has increased real wages for the high-skilled workers by using 
data from Germany. Hijzen et al (2003) have also found evidence, using data from UK, 
that outsourcing plays an important role in explaining UK wage inequality. They argue 
that outsourcing accounts for approximately half of the increase in domestic wage 
inequality. Munch and Skaksen (2005) have used data from Denmark to provide 
evidence that foreign outsourcing tends to reduce wages for the low and medium-
skilled workers, while it raises wages for the high-skilled workers. Recently, Dreher 
and Gaston (2006) have used panel data over the period 1970-2000 to study, for 
example, the effects of globalization on wage inequality. They have found that the 
economic dimension has exacerbated industrial wage inequality in developed countries, 




V.    Effects  of  Outsourcing  and  Wage Solidarity on Equilibrium 
Unemployment 
 
         So far we have studied wage formation within a partial equilibrium framework. 
We now extend our analysis to a general equilibrium setting, where the labour force is 
mobile across industries, in order to characterize the effects of outsourcing and wage 
solidarity across labour market segments on equilibrium unemployment.   
Consider a representative industry. According to (11) and (13) the labour union 
sets the wages according to 
   i i i b w Α =                                        (15) 
for labour market segment i (i=H,L), where the mark-up factors are  
 
[] ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 (
) 1 )( 1 (
a m a
m
AH − + + −
+ −
=








AL − − − + − +
+
=




respectively. We assume that all industries are identical and for that reason neglect 
industry-specific indices. In a general equilibrium context with labour mobility across 
identical industries, but no mobility across different labour market segments, the 
endogenous outside option for the labour union representing segment i,  i b , is now 
interpreted to be  
 
   i i i i i B u w u b + − = ) 1 ( ,                                 (16)  
 





benefit for workers of type i and  i w  denotes the wage determined by the union for 
workers of type i.
5  
From (16) we can immediately infer that outsourcing and wage solidarity will 
impact on the outside option available to the labour union in a general equilibrium 
context through several mechanisms. In the subsequent analysis we will analyze these 
effects in order to evaluate the overall employment consequences.  
In line with the literature we restrict ourselves to a benefit-replacement ratio 
i i w B q / ≡ , which is constant across the two labour market segments. Combining (15) 
and (16) the equilibrium unemployment  i u  in labour market segment i can be found 











    .                                         (17) 
 
According to (17) the equilibrium unemployment in each segment depends positively 
both on the benefit-replacement ratio (q) and on the wage mark-up in the labour   
market.
6 By substituting the wage mark-ups from (11) and (13) into (17) we can 
explicitly characterize the equilibrium unemployment in each of the segments, given 
outsourcing.
7  
For the high-skilled labour force we find that the equilibrium unemployment is 
given by 
 
                                                 
5       For a standard justification of this interpretation with a homogeneous labour force, see e.g. Nickell 
and Layard (1999) p. 3048-3049 for a further discussion. 




< , which we assume to hold 
throughout the analysis. 
7      Egger and Egger (2006) have presented first insights on the role of international outsourcing 
(international fragmentation of the value-added chain) for the productivity of low-skilled workers 
in EU manufacturing. Their short-run evidence exerts a negative marginal effect on real value 
added per low-skilled worker, while their long-run parameter estimates reveal a positive impact of 
outsourcing on real value added per low-skilled worker.    
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From (18) we can directly conclude that outsourcing the low-skilled tasks tends to 




uH ) in the segment of high-skilled workers. 
Intuitively, this follows from the wage-increasing effect of outsourcing for the high-
skilled workers, which was established in (12a). Moreover, straightforward calculations 
establish that increased wage solidarity reduces equilibrium unemployment for high-





). This follows from the wage-decreasing effect on high-
skilled workers of a higher degree of wage solidarity, which was established in (12b). 




























m uL      .       (19) 
 
From (19) we can directly characterize the effects of outsourcing and wage solidarity 
on equilibrium unemployment among the low-skilled workers. By (14a) outsourcing 
was found to impose wage discipline and thereby to have a wage-moderating effect for 
low-skilled workers. Consistent with this argument, (19) formally verifies that 





uL ). Further, increased wage solidarity, and thereby a higher relative preference 
for the wages of low-skilled workers, increases the equilibrium unemployment among 





). This holds true because an increased degree of wage 
solidarity induces an increase in the wage for the low-skilled workers, which was 
established in (14b). Thus, we can see that outsourcing and wage-solidarity affect  19
employment among low-skilled workers in a way which is completely opposite to the 
effects on high-skilled workers. 
We summarize these findings in the following Proposition. 
 
Proposition 3 Outsourcing and wage solidarity have opposite employment effects 
among the high-skilled and low-skilled workers.  
(a) Higher  outsourcing increases equilibrium unemployment among the high-
skilled workers, whereas it reduces it among the low-skilled workers.  
(b) Higher wage solidarity reduces equilibrium unemployment for the high-skilled 
workers, whereas it increases equilibrium unemployment for the low-skilled 
workers. 
 
In Proposition 3 we formulate conclusions which seem to be contrary to common 
views regarding the effects of outsourcing. Namely, in the public debate outsourcing is 
often seen to impose a particular threat for the low-skilled workers. As our analysis 
establishes, such a view fail to take account of how a rational l abour union with 
bargaining power would respond to a firm’s commitment to outsourcing. Since 
outsourced production and in-house production with domestic low-skilled workers are 
substitutes outsourcing induces a wage-moderating effect on the wage for low-skilled 
workers, which promotes employment in this segment of the labour force. The opposite 
employment effect of outsourcing on high-skilled workers can be explained by the fact 
that outsourcing has an opposite effect on the wage formation for the high-skilled 
workers.  
Union leaders often justify policies with wage solidarity by reference to particular 
concerns for the low-skilled workers. In light of our analysis it seems highly 
questionable whether low-skilled workers would benefit from wage solidarity, at least 
in the presence of outsourcing. As we have demonstrated, an increased degree of wage 
solidarity would tend to burden the employment opportunities for low-skilled workers 
by increasing the equilibrium unemployment in this labour force segment. 
Our model is designed in such a way that the equilibrium unemployment would 
be equal in the two labour force segments in the absence of outsourcing (m=0) and  20




= α  ). More precisely, by substituting m=0 and 
2
1
= α  into (18) and 
(19) we find that  
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.              (20) 
 
We next separate both the effects of wage solidarity in the absence of outsourcing 
and the effects of outsourcing with no wage solidarity. For that reason we initially focus 
on a configuration with wage solidarity but no outsourcing, i.e. where m=0. 















) 1 ( ) 1 (
2 1
1









u u L H ,        (21) 
which is strictly decreasing as a function of α  for 
2
1
≥ α . Thus, in combination with 
(20) we can conclude  
 
Corollary 1 The equilibrium unemployment is higher among the low-skilled 
workers than among the high-skilled workers in the absence of outsourcing. 
Furthermore, this effect is stronger the stronger is the union’s relative preference 
in favour of the low-skilled workers. 
 
         Essentially, in the absence of outsourcing wage solidarity leads the labour 
union to increase the wage for the low-skilled workers to such an extent that 
employment in this category of workers suffers.  However, the presence of 
outsourcing imposes discipline on wage formation for low-skilled workers. For 
the case with no wage solidarity, i.e. with 
2
1
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which is a strictly increasing function of m . Thus, we can conclude  
 
Corollary 2 The presence of outsourcing without wage solidarity imposes so 
much  negative pressure on the wages of the low-skilled workers that the 
equilibrium unemployment is higher for the high-skilled workers. This effect is 
stronger the higher is the amount of outsourcing.  
 
So far we have explored separately the effects of outsourcing and wage solidarity 
on equilibrium unemployment in the two labour force segments. In particular, we have 
found that these effects are opposite in the two segments. We will next evaluate the 
total effects of outsourcing and wage solidarity on equilibrium unemployment in an 
economy consisting of both labour force segments.  
Assume that the proportion  H ν  of the labour force belong to the high-skilled 
segment, whereas the complementary proportion  H L ν ν − =1  are low-skilled workers. 
In such an economy the equilibrium unemployment for the economy with 
heterogeneous workers is the weighted average of the unemployment rates in the two 
different labour force segments according to 
 
  ) , ( ) 1 ( ) , ( ) , ( α ν α ν α m u m u m u L H H H − + =   .                     (23) 
  
In the next proposition we establish that the total effects of outsourcing and wage 




(a) Increased outsourcing reduces equilibrium unemployment if and only if the 
proportion of the high-skilled workers is sufficiently low. Formally,  
) 1 ( ) 1 2 ( ) 1 (











if only and if
m
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The threshold  H v ˆ  is a decreasing function of the degree of wage solidarity.  22
(b) A higher degree of wage solidarity raises equilibrium unemployment if and 
only if the proportion of the high-skilled workers is sufficiently low. Formally, 
      
) 1 ( ) 1 (




















  . 
 The threshold  H v ~  is a decreasing function of the degree of outsourcing. 
 
Proof: See Appendix C. 
 
Proposition 4(a) essentially states that outsourcing will reduce equilibrium 
unemployment under the reasonable condition that the proportion of high-skilled 
workers is sufficiently low. The threshold  
) 1 ( ) 1 2 ( ) 1 (









H  , below 
which this conclusion holds true, depends on the degree of wage solidarity in important 
ways. Based on straightforward calculations it can be verified that this threshold is 
strictly decreasing as a function of the degree of wage solidarity. Consequently, the 
effect of outsourcing on equilibrium unemployment depends monotonically on the 
degree of wage solidarity. For outsourcing to promote employment the upper threshold 
for the proportion of high-skilled workers is reduced if the degree of wage solidarity is 
increased. 
From Proposition 4(b) we can conclude that a higher degree of wage solidarity 
burdens employment when the proportion of the high-skilled workers is sufficiently 
low. For this to happen the threshold is given by 
) 1 ( ) 1 (














= . The effects on equilibrium unemployment of 
an increasing degree of wage solidarity exhibit a systematic relationship with 
outsourcing. More precisely, increased outsourcing lowers the threshold below which 
an increased degree of wage solidarity raises equilibrium unemployment. 
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VI.   Optimal Committed Outsourcing: The Long-run Perspective   
 
So far we have restricted ourselves to a medium- or short-run perspective, where 
the firms have committed to the magnitude of their outsourcing activities. We now turn 
to explore the initial stage, where the firm commits itself to the outsourcing activity. 
We characterize how the labour market imperfections affect the equilibrium production 
mode. It is assumed that the long-run production modes decision internalizes the effects 
of the share of outsourced production on the wages of the high-skilled and low-skilled 
workers. 
In the long run the firm determines the magnitude of outsourcing so as to 
maximize profit. The firm has rational expectations regarding the subsequent outcomes 
with respect to the high-skilled and low-skilled wages and employment so that the 
production mode internalizes the effects of the share of outsourced production on 
wages and employments. The long-run production mode is determined by the following 




Max ) ( ) , , ( ) , , ( M g cM L w H w M L H F M L H L H − − − − = π                  (24)      
                 s.t.  0 , 0 , 0 = = = H w w L H U U π  and  0 = L π , 
 
where the constraints capture that the production mode is set in anticipation of 
subsequent wage formation and employment in terms of both the high-skilled and low-
skilled workers.  
By applying the envelope theorem we get the following first order condition for 
the optimal amount of committed outsourcing associated with the optimization problem 
(24) 
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w L L . Hence, in addition to the 
direct marginal cost  ) ( ' M g c + , and the direct marginal profit 
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introducing outsourcing will increase the wage cost of the high-skilled labour, while it 
will decrease the wage cost of the low-skilled labour. These findings lie in conformity 
with empirics, as we have mentioned earlier. If the ratio between the optimal high-
skilled labour and the optimal low-skilled labour is small enough (large enough), then 
the presence of labour market imperfections increases (decreases) the returns from M  
because outsourcing has wage cost-moderating (wage cost-raising) effect, i.e.   














w H L .   
 
We can now characterize how the labour union’s relative focus on low-skilled workers 
affects optimal outsourcing by reporting the following comparative statics result.  
 
Proposition 5 
A higher relative focus by the monopoly labour union on low-skilled workers will  
(a) increase the returns from outsourcing via the wage-moderating effect for low-
skilled workers, and  
(b) decrease the returns from outsourcing via the wage-increasing effect for high-
skilled workers. 
 
Proof: See Appendix D.  
 
VII.   Conclusions 
 
 
We have studied the consequences of outsourcing and wage solidarity on labour 
demand, wage dispersion, equilibrium unemployment as well as the incentives  25
associated with the introduction of outsourcing.  We have shown that both the own 
wage elasticity and the cross wage elasticity as well as the outsourcing elasticity of the 
low-skilled labour demand depend positively on the amount of outsourcing, while both 
the own wage elasticity and the cross wage elasticity as well as the outsourcing 
elasticity of the high-skilled labour demand are independent of the amount of 
outsourcing. In terms of wage formation by the monopoly labour union a higher share 
of outsourced production will decrease the wage rate by the low-skilled labour, and 
increase the wage rate by the high-skilled labour so that the home wage difference 
becomes higher. The monopoly labour union’s higher wage solidarity for the low-
skilled labour will increase (decrease) the wage rate of the low-skilled (high-skilled) 
labour. 
  Higher  outsourcing increases equilibrium unemployment among the high-
skilled workers, whereas it reduces it among the low-skilled workers. Increased wage 
solidarity reduces equilibrium unemployment for the high-skilled workers, whereas it 
increases equilibrium unemployment for the low-skilled workers.  Increased wage 
solidarity reduces equilibrium unemployment for the high-skilled workers, whereas it 
increases equilibrium unemployment for the low-skilled workers. Increased outsourcing 
increases equilibrium unemployment among the high-skilled workers, whereas it 
reduces it among the low-skilled workers. Increased wage solidarity reduces 
equilibrium unemployment for the high-skilled workers, whereas it increases 
equilibrium unemployment for the low-skilled workers. Finally, in terms of optimal 
production mode a higher relative focus by the monopoly labor union on low-skilled 
workers will decrease the returns from outsourcing via the wage-increasing effects for 
low-skilled workers. 
We have analyzed the effects of outsourcing and wage solidarity on wage 
formation and equilibrium unemployment. Likewise we have characterized the effect of 
wage solidarity on the optimal production mode with heterogeneous workers in the 
encompassing labour union. An important further research topic is to ask: What are the 
incentives of heterogeneous labour force segments to merge and negotiate the wage 
agreement as a unified labour union rather than as separate unions if the firms have  26
access to production though international outsourcing? Horn and Wolinsky (1988) have 
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Appendix A: Optimal low-skilled labour demand 
 
Substituting the RHS of (4) for H  in (3b) gives  
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which  gives  (5).           QED.   
 
Appendix B: Wage formation by monopoly labour union 
 
Substituting 
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 into equations 
(10a) and (10b) gives 
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1  in (B1) gives after some 
rearrangements the following optimal monopoly labour union wage for the high-skilled 
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H . Now equation (B4) can be expressed in equation (11) of 
the text.  
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1  into (B2) gives after some 
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Using the wage elasticities, presented earlier, (B6) it can be also expressed in equation 





Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 4 
 
In order to explore the effects of outsourcing on the economy-wide unemployment rate 
we make use of straightforward calculations to form the derivative 
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from (23). Thus, we find that  
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It should be emphasized that the threshold  ] [ 1 , 0 ˆ ∈ H v  . 
 
Further, in order to characterize the effects of an increased degree of wage solidarity on  
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Substituting (C3)  and (C4) into (C2) we can conclude that 
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Again it can directly be seen from (C5) that  ] [ 1 , 0 ~ ∈ H v  .QED. 
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Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 5 
 
The first-order condition (25) for the optimal production mode can be characterized by 
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What is the effect of the labour union’s relative preference for the low-skilled workers 
on the firm’s optimal outsourcing? Differentiating (14a) with respect to α  gives 
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 so that higher α  will decrease the returns from outsourcing via 
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 so that higher α  will increase the cost from outsourcing via the wage 
formation of high-skilled workers. QED. 
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